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ABSTRACT 
Nina Zatezalo: Croatia’s Difficult Political Trajectory after the Disintegration of 
Yugoslavia 
(Under the direction of Milada Vachudova) 
 
 This paper explores the main reasons for Croatia’s laggardness in political and 
economic reforms after the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991. While Slovenia 
experienced a relatively smooth economic and political transition thanks to the country’s 
pre-war legacy of legitimate governments,  the absence of violent conflict with Serbia, 
and the presence of institutional reforms even before membership talks with the EU, 
Croatia faced Tudjman’s nationalist and isolationist rule, the war both in Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the spread of fear and the exploitation of the media, and, 
finally, the lack of cooperation of the 2000 government with the ICTY. In other words, 
all these factors contributed to Croatia’s dismal political and economic performance of 
the 1990s. Croatia’s journey towards Europe began only after 2000 when the more EU-
friendly Social-Democrats came to power. Nevertheless, problems remain and further 
reforms are needed if Croatia is to join the EU by 2009.  
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INTRODUCTION- GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSAL 
Since the end of the Second World War the European Community (which later 
became known as the European Union), had great aspirations of economic development, 
of patriotism instead of nationalism, and of security rather than fear. Then after the fall of 
the Iron Curtain and the end of the Cold War, the main goals of Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries were to achieve peace and stability, build stable democracies, 
accomplish economic and institutional reforms, accelerate growth and modernization, 
and finally, join the European Union.  And during the next decade, ten CEE countries 
made significant progress in strengthening and implementing the political and economic 
institutions necessary for a democracy and a functioning market economy. As a result, 
they were rewarded with EU membership in 2004 (McCormick, 2005).   
Despite Tito’s numerous accomplishments during his time as president of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the richest and least oppressive country vis-à-
vis the rest of the Central and Eastern European countries during communist rule), and 
despite predictions that the country would be within the first ones to join the EU, out of 
the six Yugoslav republics only Slovenia successfully implemented the political and 
economic reforms necessary for EU membership. And while Slovenia embarked on a 
peaceful journey towards democratization and prosperity, Serbian and Croatian 
nationalist leaders set in motion a violent and destructive war that set these ex-
Yugoslavian countries on a dismal path during the 1990s.  
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In contrast to Croatia, Slovenia experienced a virtually bloodless ten day war 
because the latter was an ethnically homogenous country, and so Milosevic and his 
administration were not interested in occupying its territory. Furthermore, the Slovenian 
political and economic elites exerted themselves relentlessly in order to reform and align 
the country’s political and economic institutions to EU laws and requirements. While 
Slovenia and the rest of the CEE countries were working towards joining the EU, Croatia 
was still resolving problems stemming from the collapse of Yugoslavia, from the 
subsequent administration’s nationalist and isolationist rule, and from the war waged by 
Milosevic. All these different issues placed Croatia significantly behind Slovenia and 
several other East Central European (ECE) frontrunners.  
This paper investigates the main reasons for Croatia’s delayed journey towards 
the European Union, especially in contrast to Slovenia and to the other CEE countries 
that joined the EU as early as 2004. In order to understand the different reasons for 
Croatia’s laggardness in comparison to some of the CEE countries, I compare Croatia’s 
trajectory during and after communism to that of its more successful neighbors, 
especially Slovenia. In the first chapter I will consider the situation in both Croatia and 
Slovenia before and during Yugoslavia in order to show that the two countries shared 
many characteristics during those times. This is important if one hopes to present the 
reasons for their divergence after the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The rise in nationalist 
sentiments and the subsequent collapse of Yugoslavia will be covered in this section as 
well.  
In the second chapter of the paper I will focus on the eagerness for reform within 
the CEE countries in order to contrast their enthusiasm with Croatia’s path away from the 
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EU. Furthermore, I will present Slovenia’s path towards democratization, liberalization 
and finally, the EU. I will argue that three factors explain Slovenia’s favorable trajectory 
towards the European Union: 1) the country’s pre-war legacy of lawful governments; 2) 
the absence of violent conflict between Slovenia and Serbia after the proclamation of 
Slovenia’s independence; 3) the country’s political and economic reforms that were 
initiated before formal accession talks with the EU were set in motion. I will also discuss 
issues that the country struggled with in order to join the Union. I will consider all these 
factors in order to show that despite its excellent reputation today, Slovenia did 
experience some difficulties during certain stages of reform. It is important to remember 
that it was not all smooth sailing for Slovenia, and still the country managed to overcome 
many of its obstacles.  
In the third chapter I will examine and scrutinize the factors behind Croatia’s ten 
year delay in political and economic reforms. I will argue that three factors best explain 
Croatia’s dismal political and economic performance of the 1990s: (1) Tudjman’s 
nationalist, isolationist and authoritarian style of governance; (2) the war in Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina created by the confluence of Tudjman and Milosevic’s plans; (3) 
the proliferation of fear and the mistreatment of the public media. I will analyze the 
concepts of nationalism, media propaganda and the spread of fear of the ‘other’. 
Furthermore, I will specifically delve into the reasons behind Tudjman’s ability to get in 
power and stay in power, despite his authoritarianism and extreme nationalistic agenda.  
In the fourth chapter of the paper I will argue that a fourth factor, the lack of 
cooperation of the 2000 government with the ICTY (International Court Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia) for the capture of Croatia’s Army lieutenant Ante Gotovina, delayed 
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Croatia’s ‘return to Europe’. I will also provide an overview of some of the most recent 
changes that did take place after the election of a new coalition of parties in the year 
2000. I will discuss further needed reforms if Croatia is to join the EU by 2009 or 2010. 
Finally, in the fifth and last chapter of the paper I will attempt to offer some final 
prospects in respect to Croatia’s future in Europe and the EU. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
CROATIA AND SLOVENIA 
Croatia and Slovenia will be compared in order to provide an explanation for their 
diverging paths after their declaration of independence in June of 1991. The two shared 
many significant characteristics before and during Yugoslavia: their Hapsburg legacies, 
their geographical proximity, their similar role in the Yugoslav Federation, and their 
advanced civic and entrepreneurial traditions.  Yet, after their secession from Yugoslavia, 
the two countries embarked on very different paths. This section will cover specific 
similarities between the two before and during Yugoslavia, while the specific reasons for 
their divergence will be discussed in the next section.  
 
A SHARED HISTORY, A VERY DIFFERENT PRESENT  
In 1809, Napoleon created the Illyrian Provinces that included parts of Slovenia 
and Croatia. During his reign, Napoleon introduced the legal code and administrative 
practices of the French Republic. This gave the Croats and Slovenes “first-hand 
experience of the new economic and political liberties that inspired western Europe” 
(Glenny, 2001, pg.41). During this time, economic, political and cultural projects focused 
around the metropolitan areas. In Croatia, Zagreb assumed the role of a metropolis, and 
by the beginning of the 19th century the city grew to about 80,000 inhabitants, thus 
becoming the principal force behind all fields of social life, economic development, 
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politics and the arts. In 1866, once Austria regained power in the region, Bishop Josip 
Juraj Strossmayer, a prominent political figure at the time, founded the Croatian 
Academy of Arts and Sciences (the first one in southeastern Europe). Around the same 
time, Slovenia developed its metropolitan centers that also promoted political and 
economic development. In 1848, for instance, Ljubljana inaugurated the opening of its 
first railway station that connected Trieste and Vienna. This, in turn, created numerous 
economic changes that greatly benefited the country (Berend, 2001).  
Then, in 1867 both Slovenia and Croatia became part of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire. During the 1870s numerous reforms were implemented in Croatia: education 
was standardized and placed under state supervision, remnants of feudalism were 
removed, hospitals were built, and the transition to a “middle-class society” took place 
(Berend, 2001, pg.54).  Rijeka became the most important industrial and communications 
centre on the Croatian Littoral, while Pula served as the main port of the imperial navy. 
In Slovenia, cultural and political organizations strengthened and a political press 
emerged. 
Following the defeat and collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of 
World War I, the southern Slav states of Slovenia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Croatia 
joined forces and on Dec. 4, 1918, they formed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes. The kingdom was renamed in 1929 under a Serbian monarch as the Kingdom 
of Yugoslavia. During this time, the authoritarian rule of the Belgrade-based government 
caused strong resentment in Croatia. Then, the incessant Croatian-Serbian political 
scuffles blew up after the assassination of Stjepan Radic, the head of the Croatian 
nationalist Peasant Party. Following this event, Ante Pavelic founded an extremist 
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nationalist-separatist movement known as the Ustasha (Glenny, 2001).  
 In 1941 Yugoslavia fell to the Axis powers, and in April of the same year, Hitler, 
along with Ante Pavelic and his fascist and xenophobic gang known as the Ustasha, 
formed the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska, or NDH). Despite 
its name, NDH was not an independent state. For instance, its economy served mainly to 
raise money for the "German war machine, its independent status was not even 
recognized by the international community, and its government could act only with the 
consent of the occupying powers" (Singleton, 1989, pg.177).   
The Ustasha aimed to obtain an ethnically pure Croatia. In order to achieve this 
goal, they enacted race laws against the Jews, the Roma, but especially the Serbs, whom 
they saw as the greatest obstacle to an ethnically pure Croatian state. And on April 17 of 
1941, Pavelic and the Ustasha entered Zagreb, and then proceeded to exterminate Jews 
and Orthodox Serbs of Croatia proper and of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Eventually, all those 
who opposed or threatened the Ustasha were outlawed or brutally murdered. And while 
Croatia acted as a mere puppet state of the Axis powers, Slovenia fought a guerrilla war 
against the Nazis under the leadership of the Croatian-born Communist resistance leader, 
Josip Broz Tito (Rothchild & Wingfield, 2000). This path divergence between the Croats 
and the Slovenes during World War II would eventually have a strong impact on the 
events that unraveled in 1991.  
The Yugoslav communist anti-fascist partisan movement emerged in Croatia as 
early as 1941, and as the movement began to gain popularity, Tito's partisans included 
Croats, Serbs, Bosnians, Slovenes and Macedonians (all of whom believed in a unified 
Yugoslav state). And at the end of World War II, with the defeat of the Nazi regime, the 
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Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was born under the helm of Marshal Tito. In 
order to gain massive domestic support, Tito decentralized the federal administration, he 
diminished many of the privileges of the elite, and he expanded people’s freedoms and 
rights. For instance, citizens were allowed to travel to almost any country because of 
Yugoslavia's neutral stance in the political world (Rothchild & Wingfield, 2000). Such 
free travel was unheard of at the time in any of the Eastern Bloc countries, and in some 
western countries as well (such as Spain or Portugal who were both dictatorships at the 
time). Furthermore, the country underwent a rebuilding process through industrialization 
and tourism. The government created unprecedented economic and industrial growth, 
high levels of social security and a practically nonexistent unemployment rate.  
The economy developed from a type of planned market socialism called 
samoupravljanje (self-management), in which the workers earned a percentage of the 
profits from the state-owned enterprises. Soon, this kind of market socialism achieved 
higher levels of Gross Domestic Product, which in turn led to better economic conditions 
than in the other Eastern Bloc countries. Croatia also went through intensive 
industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s, during which time Zagreb managed to surpass 
Belgrade thanks to the Croatian Adriatic coast and its status as an internationally popular 
tourist destination (Rothchild & Wingfield, 2000).  
But despite all these achievements and despite the initial goal of individual and 
collective strength that could only be realized by uniting forces of the six republics that 
came to represent Yugoslavia, it soon became obvious that in this union, Serbia was the 
dominant force. And the fact that Slovenia and Croatia were economically the most 
prosperous in Yugoslavia did not make a difference (Bartlett, 2003).  This unmerited 
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position of the Serbs eventually led to an upsurge of Croatian nationalist feelings that 
fully manifested themselves with the 1971 Croatian Spring. The Croatian Spring was a 
nationalist movement that quickly evolved into a mass political-social movement. The 
movement called for economic and democratic reform and for greater rights for the 
Croatian people within the federation (Singleton, 1989).  
In spite of extensive urbanization, industrialization, and a rapidly expanding 
economy at the beginning of the 1960s and 1970s, dissatisfaction with the system was 
significant, especially in Slovenia and Croatia. The advance of certain sectors, such as the 
Croatian tourist industry, grew rapidly and yielded great profits. And even though Croatia 
and Slovenia were indeed the more advanced and developed on both the economic and 
cultural levels, Serbia remained the dominant force (Rothchild & Wingfield, 2000).  
From the Croatian perspective the problem was that a significant portion of its 
profits went towards developing the poorer regions of Yugoslavia. Furthermore, a 
government that became marked by corruption and cronyism shattered many of the 
improvements of Yugoslavia’s economic and social reforms of the 1970s and 1980s (U.S. 
State Department, 2006). And although Tito managed to suppress the rising nationalist 
sentiments to an extent, the 1960s saw an upsurge of Croatian nationalism, which 
culminated with the Croatian Spring. And once the movement became too intense, Tito 
and the communist party arrested and imprisoned several important Croatian political 
leaders. Among those arrested were Marko Veselica, the leader of the movement, and 
Franjo Tudjman, a political dissident and future president of the Croatian state (Singleton, 
1989). In sum, the disproportionate contributions to the focal state (Serbia), governmental 
corruption, and further hyperinflation of the 1980s contributed to enormous discontent 
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and to a rise in nationalism both in Croatia and in Slovenia. 
And when Belgrade initiated plans to further concentrate political and economic 
power in its own hands (within a few years of Tito's death in 1980), Croatian and 
Slovenian nationalism began to reappear as well. Soon, nationalism became represented 
by underground secessionist organizations among those living in the country and among 
the Diaspora (émigré organizations). By defying the politicians in Belgrade, Slovenia and 
Croatia experienced a blossoming of democracy to a degree almost unprecedented in the 
communist world. And by this point, “the conflict had turned into one between a more 
liberal, pluralistic, West-oriented and premarket Croatia and Slovenia and a more 
authoritarian, anti-West and anti-market Serbia” (Ognyanova, 2005, pg. 8). As a 
consequence, at the end of the 1980s, Croatia and Slovenia decided it was time to break 
away from the Yugoslav federation. 
   
THE END OF THE YUGOSLAV FEDERATION 
In 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence, and in January of 
1992, they both became officially recognized as sovereign states.  And while both nations 
“surpassed all other Yugoslav republics in their readiness to enter European institutions” 
by declaring their independence, and while “leaders of the independence movements of 
both countries made euphoric proclamations of their ‘return to Europe’ after being held 
captive in the Balkan federation,” only Slovenia actually did so (Lindstrom, 2000, 
pg.316). Despite their common desire to join the West and leave the Balkans behind, 
Croatia and Slovenia approached the future in drastically different ways after the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia, and for this reason they are facing a very different reality 
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today.  
While Slovenia satisfied EU requirements and was rewarded with EU 
membership in 2004 along with other CEE frontrunners, Croatia still struggled to 
implement important political and economic reforms. In order to give support to this 
claim, I now turn to the key factors that explain Slovenia’s success. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
THE SLOVENIAN CASE 
Slovenia was the first republic to secede from Yugoslavia, and in this case this led 
to a virtually bloodless ten day war. Of all the Yugoslav states, Slovenia was able to have 
the least problematic transition towards liberal democracy: it applied for membership in 
1996, it began its negotiations in 1998, and then it joined the EU in 2004 (Ramet, 2006). 
And today, the country is considered a regional success story.  But, which factors allowed 
Slovenia to align its political and economic institutions to EU requirements so rapidly 
and promptly?  In this section I will argue that three main factors explain Slovenia’s 
favorable trajectory towards the European Union: 1) the country’s pre-war legacy of 
lawful governments; 2) the absence of violent conflict between Slovenia and Serbia after 
the proclamation of Slovenia’s independence in 1991; 3) the country’s political and 
economic reforms before the formal accession talks with the EU.  All three of these 
factors will be discussed next. 
 
SLOVENIA’S EARLY SHIFT TO A LAWFUL GOVERNMENT (FACTOR 1) 
The first important reason for Slovenia’s fast-paced transition could be attributed 
to its early shift to a lawful government. Slovenia’s League of Communists, for instance, 
already embarked on the transition to a pluralist system in the mid-1980s, building 
bridges with the Slovenian opposition, and, in the process, beginning the transition to a 
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legitimate government. And from this evolved a political elite that was more committed 
to change and more willing to proceed rapidly, away from state socialism and closer to 
the EU (Ramet, 2006).  
The new coalition of governments that evolved after the declaration of 
independence was in favor of EU membership, as were the Slovenian people (67 percent 
of constituents were in favor of membership) (Lindstrom, 2000). In other words, it was 
easier for the EU to provide a strong enough impetus for reform here since most major 
political parties and a majority of their constituents supported EU membership.  
 
SERBIA LEAVES SLOVENIA ALONE (FACTOR 2) 
A second important reason for Slovenia’s successful process of transformation 
could be attributed to the absence of conflict with Belgrade. In contrast to Croatia, which 
experienced a five-year war after its declaration of independence, Slovenia’s conflict with 
Belgrade was resolved within ten days. And during this time Slovenia experienced 
virtually no human or material losses. As a consequence, Slovenia could secure an 
effective democratic system, as well as greater freedom and liberty in a shorter period of 
time.  
So while Croatia dealt with the devastating effects of the tragic war and with 
Tudjman’s authoritarian and isolationist type of nationalism, Slovenia embarked on a 
prosperous journey towards the EU. Croatia became “entrapped in an ideology that was 
rather suspicious of all supra-national organizations and especially of the EU, while 
Slovenia moved quickly away from its own isolationist type of nationalism of the early 
1990s to a much more open liberal Europeanism” (Jovic, 2006, pg. 85). For this reason 
  14 
 
Slovenia was able to start negotiations at a much earlier stage than was the case in 
Croatia.  
 
SLOVENIA’S EARLY INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS (FACTOR 3) 
The last factor that contributed to Slovenia’s success involves the idea that the 
country’s institutional and administrative reforms commenced even before it began 
accession talks with the EU. When Slovenia’s negotiations with the EU finally started the 
fulfillment of the many requirements of the Acquis Communautaire was relatively 
straightforward since similar economic and political reforms began even before accession 
negotiations took place. Very often, Slovenia was faced with having to adjust, and not 
actually reform its legislation with the Acquis Communautaire, and so the whole process 
took much less time to complete and was significantly less demanding (Lindstrom, 2000). 
And despite an obstacle or two, Slovenia was able to continue with its reforms in a timely 
manner. Nevertheless, it is important to mention some of the problems that the country 
faced then and is still perhaps facing today.  
 
SLOVENIA’S DARK SIDE: RACISM AND THE PROBLEM OF THE “ERASED” 
In spite of Slovenia’s status as a model post-communist state, with its well 
organized civil society, and living standards ever so closer to the rest of the EU countries, 
the country did struggle in regards to certain ideological reforms. For instance, in 1992 
around eighteen thousand individuals were removed from the Slovenian registry of 
permanent residents and placed in the registry of foreigners.  During Yugoslavia citizens 
of the other republics living in Slovenia possessed the same rights as Slovenians, but 
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once the country attained independence, all of those individuals of non-Slovene or mixed 
ethnicity lost their political, economic and social rights. Obviously, most of the “erased” 
came from the so-called ‘new minorities’, which included ethnic Serbs, Croatians, 
Bosnian Muslims, Albanian Kosovars and ethnic Roma (Gaubes, 2004). In other words, 
the Slovenian government violated the principles of equality and non-discrimination, 
while attempting to ethnically purify the country by forcing many to leave as a result of 
their ‘illegal’ status.  
When in 2000, the Slovenian Constitutional Court decided to reestablish the civil 
and political rights of these ex-citizens, some opposition parties and at least one coalition 
party contested this decision. Some politicians went as far as to publicly question the 
legitimacy of those “erased.” And in 2004, the Slovenian Parliament was still debating 
what to do about the six thousand individuals whose status in the new Slovenian state 
was still unknown (Gaubes, 2004). 
At the same time, another group also considered ‘foreign’ by most Slovenians 
began to voice its needs. The group asked for a permit to build the first Mosque in the 
country for the fifty thousand Muslims that lived there. The request was immediately 
repudiated by the twelve thousand signatures from people who refused to have a Mosque 
built in their country (Gaubes, 2004). These two cases indicate the attitude that many 
Slovenian people and some of their political leaders have towards minorities. And this is 
an important issue, especially for a country that is considered to be moderate, tolerant and 
a success story in the eyes of the West. In addition, Slovenia will be hosting the EU 
presidency next year, and some of these issues are yet to be resolved.  
 But despite these drawbacks, Slovenia did become one of the first Central and 
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East European countries to join the European Union in 2004, and the European Monetary 
Union in 2007. And so while Slovenia commenced a prosperous journey towards 
political and economic reform, Croatia was still dealing with Tudjman’ nationalist 
rhetoric, a tragic war and its aftermath. Once faced with Tudjman’s nationalist 
propaganda and the aggression waged by the Milosevic's regime, Croatia could not 
proceed with democratization at the same pace.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
THE TWO COUNTRIES DIVERGE 
I now turn to the specific reasons for Croatia’s delay in political and economic 
reforms, which among other things also delayed the country’s integration into the 
European Union.  I will argue that three factors best explain Croatia’s dismal political 
and economic performance of the 1990s: (1) the nationalist, xenophobic, corrupt and 
authoritarian nature of the Tudjman regime; (2) the war in Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina caused by the confluence of Tudjman and Milosevic’s plans; and (3) the 
proliferation of fear and the exploitation of the media. 
During the 1990s, Croatia and Slovenia found themselves in very different 
positions due to Tudjman’s anti-western, nationalistic and non-democratic rule, and due 
to the extreme differences in the length and intensity of the conflict that followed their 
declaration of independence. Tudjman built a disturbing human rights record, tragically 
intervened in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and refused to cooperate with the international 
community. The human and material losses, as well as a variety of social and economic 
problems that followed, only aggravated the complex process of transition after the war. 
Consequently, Croatia became an outcast nation of the 1990s.   
But in order to understand Croatia at this point in time, one has to take a look at 
ex-Yugoslavia right before the beginning of the war. An important aspect was a rising 
sense of nationalism that, in fact, was a prelude to the war in question.  
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THE NATURE OF THE TUDJMAN GOVERNMENT ELECTED IN 1990 
(FACTOR I) 
As communism faded away in the late 1980s, nationalism flourished in all the ex-
Yugoslavian republics. Political leaders, such as Tudjman and Milosevic, began using 
nationalism as a weapon in their political struggle for power.  It was precisely President 
Slobodan Milosevic who appeared first on the political scene with the claim that he 
would protect Serbian national interests in Kosovo. And after Slovenia and Croatia 
demanded more decentralization, the only viable alternative, according to Milosevic, was 
an enlarged, independent Serbia that would encompass all the areas where Serbian 
minorities lived. This included Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a 12 % Serbian 
minority in Croatia and a 37 % minority in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ognyanova, 2005). 
And as a multi-party system began to emerge, a number of ultranationalist groups 
and movements emerged as well. When the first multi-party elections were conducted in 
all six Yugoslav republics, Serbia and Montenegro communists remained in power, while 
in the other republics the opposition forces won the elections. And it was during this time 
that Franjo Tudjman and his party Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska Demokratska 
Zajednica or HDZ) came to power.  
 Along with the new pluralistic party order, a vast number of nationalist parties 
and movements emerged, including the rightwing HDZ led by Franjo Tudjman. It was 
not surprising that HDZ won the majority of votes in the Croatian Parliament considering 
the hostile climate of Milosevic's reign. In these circumstances, Tudjman and his 
administration became a mass movement that captured numerous votes by pledging to 
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fulfill the 1000 year old dream of an independent Croatia (Silber & Little, 1998). Even 
though Tudjman did achieve sovereignty for Croatia, he also politically isolated it from 
the rest of the world with his anti-western, nationalist and autocratic style of leadership. 
And while Tudjman initially intended to integrate with the West and, ultimately, join 
NATO and the EU, his human rights record and his nationalist ideology would not allow 
this to happen. 
 According to Irina Ognyanova, Tudjman’s ideology was based on an independent 
and sovereign Croatia that would encompass all territory within its “historical and natural 
boundaries” (2005, p.8). Tudjman, like Milosevic, believed in a nationally homogenous 
state, and so his goal was to gather all Croats in a single nation-state through ‘human 
transfers’ and exchanges of territory. This also involved Bosnia and Herzegovina, since 
many ethnic Croatians lived there. In fact, Tudjman made claims of a Greater Croatia at 
the same time he claimed to protect his people from Milosevic’s desires for a ‘greater 
Serbian hegemony’ (Ognyanova, 2005, p.17). Both sides were fighting for the creation of 
an ethnic state, which naturally led to conflict within these ethnically mixed territories of 
Yugoslavia. 
According to Hajdinjak, Tudjman’s primary goal during the 1980s was to 
establish a Croatian nation-state that would be based on reconciling all the ideological 
differences between the old Croatian Partisans and the Ustasha in order to work together 
towards a modern, independent and democratic Croatia (2001). This goal provided 
Tudjman with strong support from some rich Croatian émigré, many of whom he 
befriended during his travels abroad. Before the 1990 elections, Tudjman and his HDZ 
officials traveled abroad and gathered large financial contributions from these very well 
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standing Croatian expatriates. The latter contributed as much as four million dollars to 
Tudjman’s first electoral campaign (Silber & Little, 1998).  
Tudjman and his party rose to power thanks to the support and sponsorship from 
this highly politicized community of Croatian émigré, many of whom left Yugoslavia 
after the Second World War or after the unsuccessful Croatian Spring of 1971. 
Furthermore, many of these expatriates held radical views, and some hoped for the return 
of the Independent State of Croatia (or NDH) that was based on Ustasha ideology. This, 
in turn, strongly influenced HDZ’s political agenda, which, among other things, called for 
the establishment of a Croatian nation-state that not only included Croatia proper, but 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and sections of today's Serbia and Montenegro as well (Silber & 
Little, 1998).  
Gojko Susak was one of the most important and powerful Croatian émigré during 
the 1980s and 1990s. During his time in Canada, Susak became one of the most active 
Croatian political hardliners of the so-called Herzegovina Lobby. He became involved 
with the Croatian Franciscans who were very politically involved as well: in the late 
1980s, they invited Tudjman to Canada in order to discuss the current political situation 
in Croatia. During that particular visit, Susak and Tudjman became close friends and 
associates (The Associated Press, 1998). And before returning to Croatia, Susak and his 
‘circle of friends’ managed to raise huge amounts of money among other Croatians in 
North America.  
In order to help Tudjman win Croatia's first multi-party elections in 1990, Susak 
drummed up millions of dollars from hard-line nationalists who hoped for Croatian 
independence. And when Tudjman and his party finally defeated the communists in the 
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1990 elections, they rapidly adopted many aspects of the old regime (e.g., authoritarian 
rule). Soon it became evident that the new nationalist HDZ-led government was imposing 
party rule instead the rule of law (Hajdinjak, 2001). Furthermore, many military decrees 
were introduced which gave exclusive power to the regime. 
It was during this time that Susak returned to his native land. Tudjman appointed 
him first to Minister of Immigration, and then to Minister of Defense. And it was 
precisely Susak who organized crucial support for Bosnia's Croats throughout the 1992-
95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He was also the first to lead Croatian officials to 
western Herzegovina, the focal point of Croatian nationalism and Susak’s birthplace (The 
Associated Press, 1998). It was Susak’s involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina that led 
to the creation of a Croatian state Herzeg-Bosna, and to a subsequent war between the 
Herzegovinian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims, who until then were allies in the fight 
against the Serbs. 
When he died in 1998, CNN announced that “Susak’s death could spell the end 
for the powerful Bosnian Croat lobby in the Croatian government and will deprive 
Tudjman's Croatian Democratic Union of someone who had natural authority over a 
vociferous wing of the party” (The Associated Press, 1998). Nevertheless, it still stands 
that Croatia’s involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina discredited and smeared the 
country’s reputation. But Tudjman and his powerful Herzegovina Lobby did not pay 
attention to criticisms from the international community since they had much greater 
goals in mind. Two aims were of utmost importance: uniting parts of Herzegovina with 
Croatia, and turning Croatia into an ethnically homogenous nation. They planned to 
accomplish these goals by invading and conquering parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
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then by forcing the rest of the Serb population out of the country.  
Tudjman’s anti-Serbian propaganda 
At first, Tudjman’s main goal was to gain national independence and to establish 
a Croatian nation-state. Once this was accomplished, the Croatian authorities continued 
to persecute non-Croatian citizens and other various critics of the government. Croatian 
post-communist nationalism turned into a force towards the creation of a nation-state 
over the whole Croatian ethnic territory, and exclusively for the protection of the interests 
of the Croatian ethnic community as a whole, not taking into account individual and 
minority rights. For this reason, Serbs started to be treated as “second class citizens” and 
became subjected to persistent discrimination and mistreatment (Ognyanova, 2005). 
Many Serbs were expelled from their jobs in the police and security forces, in the media 
and from various factories. 
When examining ethnic minority rights in ex-Yugoslavia, Dragan Simeunovic 
concluded that “contemporary nation-states support an idea whose principal value lies in 
the consolidation of state and nation on the base of nationalism, and in the total 
subjugation of individuals and minorities to supremacy of a ruling nation. The organic 
principle of new nationalist states is to give priority to collective rights over individual 
ones and to subjugate ethnic minorities to the majority” (Sahara, 2001, p.137). The 
creation of a state based on ethnic homogeneity demanded unity against ‘the enemy’ 
(Croatian Serbs) and confrontation with the neighbor (Serbia) which was accused of 
“threatening the integrity of the state with a presence of its own minority inside its 
boundaries” (Ognyanova, 2005, p. 16). 
As a result, nationalist and anti-Serb rhetoric became frequently adopted by 
  23 
 
Tudjman and soon became the essence of his policy. The Croatian media was committed 
to distinguish Serbs from Croats and to create a real gap between the two nations. In 
order to do so, the new government focused on Croatian Catholicism versus Serbian 
Orthodoxy, and on the Croatian language, which was specifically declared as different 
(Ognyanova, 2005). For instance, the grass-roots movement for the purification of the 
Croatian language quickly replaced Serbian words with neologisms and historically 
Croatian words, but left those words of German, Italian, or Hungarian origin intact.  
Therefore, it cannot be disputed that Tudjman and his administration showed no 
interest in gaining Serbia’s confidence, and that Croatia’s national policies did not 
include anything on the protection of Serbian minority rights. For instance, those Serbs 
that remained in the regions of Krajina and Eastern Slavonia after Croatia reclaimed this 
territory in 1995, were often threatened and attacked by both civilians and soldiers. And 
despite several attempts to facilitate the return of those who fled, the great majority of 
Croatian Serbs still remain in exile to this day (Sahara, 2001). But before going any 
further, I will first consider the war waged by Serbia in 1991.  
The war that emerged in Croatia in 1991 and in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992 
was caused by the confluence of Tudjman and Milosevic’s power ambitions. Both leaders 
aspired to form a ‘greater’ nation state of their own. And in order to achieve their goal of 
a Greater Croatia or a Greater Serbia, the nationalist and authoritarian leaders agreed to 
partition Bosnia and Herzegovina between Croatia and Serbia. But the problem was that 
before waging war on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milosevic waged war on Croatia as well.  
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THE WAR IN CROATIA AND IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (FACTOR 2) 
The second factor that shaped Croatia’s unfavorable trajectory during the 1990s 
appeared on the scene once the country declared its independence in 1991. I am, of 
course, referring to the Croatian-Serbian War. In contrast to the Slovenian case, the 
Croatian attempt to leave the Yugoslav federation was difficult and painful. Croatia was 
confronted by the Serbian rebels who were determined not to live under Croatian rule 
(Glenny, 2001). And in this war, both Tudjman and Milosevic played the same game: by 
spreading nationalist sentiments and by instilling a strong fear of the ‘other’, both leaders 
accumulated and strengthened their power.  
By the summer of 1990, the Serbs in Croatia were in a state of insurrection. 
Milosevic encouraged extremist national groups to revenge themselves for the massacres 
committed by the Ustasha in World War II. Open hostilities erupted in the region, and in 
a very short period of time the Serbian groups from the Krajina region conquered a 
significant number of Croatian towns (Ognyanova, 2005). In turn, Tudjman launched a 
military initiative hoping to bring the war to an end. But to Tudjman’s dismay, the war 
spread, and between July and December of 1991, the well-armed Serbian military groups 
consolidated their control over almost one-third of Croatian territory. 
 The war was fought entirely on Croatian territory. This brought massive 
destruction to cities such as Vukovar and Dubrovnik. Around 10,000 people died, others 
were wounded, and those who lived in Serbian regions were forced out. With time, the 
number of refugees reached 600,000. Also during this time Croatia’s economy was 
shattered both by the government and by other corrupt ‘organizations’: the state’s 
currency became overvalued by at least 40 percent; enterprises were stolen, sold off to 
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the mafia, and then ruined; and then an austere economic policy was implemented, which 
made the World Bank happy but the Croatian people miserable (The Associated Press, 
2006). 
All these different issues let the international community in on the gravity of the 
situation. Shortly thereafter, countries such as Germany and Austria began to campaign 
for the immediate recognition of both Croatia’s and Slovenia’s independence, and in 
January of 1992 the international community recognized both countries, despite their 
initial reluctance to do so (Woodward, 2000). The problem was that minority rights had 
not been established yet, and Croatian nationalism did not seem to be losing ground. In 
fact, the opposite seemed to be the case: there would be no peace until Croatia reclaimed 
all territory it had previously lost to Serbia. 
With Washington’s support, in 1995 the Croatian army carried out the military 
operations “Flash” and “Storm” in Western Slavonia and Krajina. The mission was a 
success for the Croatian army, and as a result, between 150 and 200,000 Serbs left the 
country. This reduced the Serbian population in Croatia from twelve to three percent 
(Ognyanova, 2005). The Tudjman government had finally realized its nineteenth century 
dream of an independent and pure Croatia. The country reached a rare level of national 
purity, parallel only to that in Slovenia. Once this was accomplished, the next goal of the 
Croatian administration involved Croatian unification with parts of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  
While the Croatian elites harbored hopes for a Greater Croatia, Serbia wished to 
create a Greater Serbian state. As a result, the natural consequence of the Serbo-Croatian 
War was the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina that soon turned into a struggle for 
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dominance between the Croats and the Serbs. 
 
Croatia’s disturbing role in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Even before the war started, Croatian nationalists advocated the idea of a Greater 
Croatia: the goal was to unify Croatia and parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina into a single 
sovereign Croatian state. As early as 1989, HDZ opened branch organizations in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and Tudjman openly spoke about Croatia’s historic and ethnic rights 
over the region. Tudjman and Milosevic even met in secret in order to agree on the 
partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They decided to divide the country according to the 
Cvetkovic-Macek sporazum of 1939, which stated that one half of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina would go to Croatia and the other half to Serbia (Glenny, 2001).  
From the very beginning Tudjman hoped to build an ethnically cleansed Croatian 
republic in Herzegovina that would eventually be unified with Croatia. And as early as 
1991, Tudjman openly stated that the only solution to the complicated problem of this 
region was to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina between Croatia and Serbia. In the 
meantime, Tudjman created close connections between Zagreb’s top political and 
military circles and the Croatian leadership in Bosnia-Herzegovina which was led by 
Mate Boban. Boban publicly claimed that he was in favor of a united and independent 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, but in reality, he was hoping for a loose confederation between the 
three autonomous state units (Hajdinjak, 2001).  And in June of 1992, local Croatian 
nationalists finally formed an autonomous region in Western Herzegovina that became 
known as the Croat Community of Herzeg-Bosna. 
By October of 1992, Tudjman gave up all pretenses of a Croatian alliance with 
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Sarajevo, and the relationship between Croatia and Bosnia sharply declined. During this 
time, Tudjman encouraged the Bosnian Croats to ally themselves with the Bosnian Serbs, 
and shortly thereafter, the Croatian army was collaborating with the Serbian forces. And 
while the “major aggressors were the Serb nationalists, Croat troops also occupied large 
parts of Bosnia and frequently fought the Muslim troops of the Bosnian government” 
(Ognyanova, 2005, pg.19). In other words, the Croatian army and certain Croatian 
paramilitary groups committed many unspeakable crimes during their occupation of 
Herzeg-Bosna.  
But then in 1994 the Croatian-Bosnian alliance began to be restored as the 
international community demanded that the Bosnian Croats ally themselves with the 
Bosniaks against the Bosnian Serbs. And in March of the same year, Tudjman signed an 
agreement with the Bosnian president Izetbegovic, and the Croat-Muslim Federation 
came to life (Ramet, 2005; Sahara, 2001).  
As the evidence so clearly suggests, the second factor that accounts for Croatia’s 
dismal political and economic performance of the 1990s is the war that started in Croatia 
in 1991, and ended in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995. While the war waged on Croatia 
drastically destroyed its economy, and left many people dead or hungry, the war that 
Croatia waged on Bosnia and Herzegovina devastated its reputation and discredited its 
integrity as well. As a result, the Serbo-Croatian-Bosniak war set Croatia behind the CEE 
countries and their political and economic reforms. I will now turn to the third factor that 
involves the two leaders’ proliferation of fear and their exploitation of the media in an 
attempt to get in power and stay in power. 
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NATIONALISM, THE CULTIVATION OF FEAR AND THE ROLE OF THE 
MEDIA IN EX-YUGOSLAVIA (FACTOR 3) 
 Having considered the dismal consequences of the Tudjman regime for Croatia’s 
political, economic and international trajectory, I ask: why was such a regime elected and 
how did it manage to stay in power for so long?  I will consider the different approaches 
that Tudjman utilized in order to get in power and stay in power, despite his dismal 
human rights record and his xenophobic, extreme and authoritarian style of leadership. In 
this segment I will focus on the manipulations that Tudjman employed in order to fulfill 
his political agenda. Furthermore, I will investigate the reasons for the moderates’ 
demise, and the role that the media and fear of the ‘other’ played in granting Tudjman a 
mass following within the Croatian people. 
 
The proliferation of fear 
 During his reign, Tudjman’s rhetoric focused on fear of the ‘other’, whose 
supposed intention was to dominate, oppress, rape and savage (before the war had even 
begun). For instance, according to Milosevic, a longtime media analyst, “in Serbia and 
Croatia, TV fabricated and shamelessly circulated war crime stories . . . the same victims 
would be identified on Zagreb screens as Croat, on Belgrade screens as Serb” (Obershall, 
2000, pg.19). In turn, this intensified sense of fear and crisis provided an opportunity for 
nationalists like Tudjman to mobilize a huge ethnic constituency, get himself elected to 
office, and organize aggressive actions against moderates and other ethnics. And since 
the most crucial element here is the removal of the source of threat, Tudjman promised to 
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do just that. 
In addition, repetition was used as an effective technique: it did not matter 
whether something was true, as long as it was being repeated. In Croatia practically all 
radio and TV programs were controlled by the state. All media was ruled by HDZ leaders 
and national news agencies. Political views and the regime’s ideologies were propagated 
by the main newspapers, such as Vjesnik, Vecernji List and Slobodna Dalmacija 
(Ognyanova, 2005). This, in turn, led to strong censorships (e.g., activities in certain 
areas of the country could not be covered in the news) and violations of freedom of 
speech. 
 
The role of the media  
Despite the government’s pledge to endorse freedom of speech, the latter soon 
showed that it would not allow for any kind of dissident thought. For instance, those 
editors and reporters who were critical of the regime were let go, and those who seemed 
loyal took their places. Furthermore, many journalists lost their jobs because of 
“improper” ethnic origin. Milovan Sibl, the head of the Croatian News Reporting 
Agency, justified this by saying that journalists of mixed origin “cannot provide an 
objective picture of Croatia because they hate Croatia, they hate President Tudjman and 
everything he stands for” (Hajdinjak, 2001, pg.63). In other words, Tudjman propagated 
hate, fear and xenophobic nationalism through the media (press, radio, television), which 
was entirely in his and his administration’s hands.  
 Pulsic also believes that nationalism was amplified by blatantly manipulating the 
public. He points out that “during the three weeks of watching television news, I did not 
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observe a single critical opinion of President Tudjman or the HDZ” (Obershall, 2000, pg. 
994). The media practically never criticized the extreme nationalism of the leadership of 
Herceg-Bosna and insisted that forces from Croatia proper never participated in the 
fighting. The ruling elites, state-controlled media, numerous intellectuals and popular 
public figures joined to create a black and white ‘reality’ in which Serbs (and later 
Muslims) were the villains, and the Croats innocent victims.  
But even before Croatia’s independence and the subsequent war, the new and 
‘improved’ political parties rallied in big public spaces, and engaged in nationalist 
rhetoric and attacks on other nationalities. During one such gathering in Bosanska 
Gradiska the local HDZ handed out flags that read ‘Serbs are swine, Serbs should leave’ 
(Obershall, 2000). Electoral campaigns propagated bigotry, hatred and misinformation 
about other nationalities to millions of people via television and during political rallies. 
As a result, these politicians created a sense of insecurity and fear, which in turn 
disrupted the social and political stability of the country. 
 Furthermore, Tudjman and his administration used the past to manipulate and 
control the emotions of the public. For instance, during the 1990 election campaign, all 
HDZ election posters were marked by a letter "H" for Hrvatska, and all the flags had the 
traditional Croatian chessboard depicted on them. Therefore, from the very beginning 
Tudjman and his party adopted an exceptionally aggressive nationalistic tone in order to 
set the boundaries between the allegedly “European, civilized, democratic, developed, 
educated and Catholic Croats” on one side, and the “Balkan, primitive, authoritarian, 
backward, illiterate Orthodox Serbs” on the other (Hajdinjak, 2001, pg. 93). 
Also during the 1990 elections, voters were not properly informed about the many 
  31 
 
different political parties since politicians had limited time and resources to organize for 
the campaign. Politicians mainly focused on nationalism, symbolism and personality, 
which were highly effective in such ambiguous times. According to Woodward, 
nationalistic rhetoric was effective because the “message is simple, it relies on the 
familiar, takes little resources, it does not have to develop a new political language and 
explain the complexities of democratic institutions and market economy . . . nationalist 
appeals thus provide the easiest route to politics for politicians without established 
constituencies and party organization” (1995, p. 124). Furthermore, the nationalist 
rhetoric of the more extreme parties defeated and discredited those who were less eager 
to spread nationalist propaganda, but who instead chose to take a more critical position 
regarding the situation in the country. 
 
The defeat of the moderates  
The downfall of the moderates was mostly due to their loss of credibility in the 
face of the crisis. They did not seem competent enough to deal with the intensity of the 
situation. Tudjman left the impression that nobody else could do a better job than him in 
trying to protect Croatia, and that all the country’s problems were almost without a doubt 
the ‘outsiders’ fault (Milosevic, the EU…) (Hajdinjak, 2001). Any opposition forces were 
immediately silenced since any objection to the status quo was seen as a threat to national 
security. And once the war started, it was the perfect excuse for the continuously 
worsening living conditions in the country. 
Furthermore, the moderates were intimidated and threatened by other extremist 
nationalists: they would receive anonymous threat letters, were fired from their jobs, 
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forced into military service, charged with treason, and sometimes they even ended up 
dead. One such example was the murder of Josip Rheil-Kir, the regional Croat police 
chief from Slavonia. Rheil-Kir was a moderate who negotiated cease-fires between Serbs 
and Croatians, and for this he was gunned down by a HDZ extremist official (Obershall, 
2000). Naturally, such unethical, inoculating and drastic measures helped Tudjman and 
his HDZ win the confidence and vote of the public. By spreading fear, insecurity and 
nationalist rhetoric, these leaders ensured themselves a place in the spotlight.   
While there is no doubt that Croatia was in fact a victim (parts of its territory were 
occupied, many of its towns bombed and some completely destroyed, many people killed 
and many forced to leave their homes), the attempt to present Croatia as a victim and 
nothing but a victim was so vigorous that it made it impossible to realistically evaluate 
the situation. It was utterly impossible, for instance, for many Croatians to see that their 
people did in fact commit appalling crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
It was not until the year 2000 that Croatia finally took its first steps towards 
political and economic reform. Only after Tudjman died in 1999 and his nationalist and 
isolationist party lost parliamentary and presidential elections in the following year did 
Croatia witness a political turnaround in regards to Europe and the EU (Jovic, 2006). It 
was, indeed, the prospect of joining the EU that finally changed the character of Croatian 
politics. 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
THE POST-TUDJMAN GOVERNMENT: THE BEGINNING OF CROATIA’S 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS TOWARDS THE EU 
 
Croatia witnessed a radical change in ideology once the main foreign policy 
objective became joining the EU. The electoral victory of a coalition of social democratic 
political parties began advocating inclusion in the Euro- Atlantic institutions, economic 
progress, as well as the strengthening in regional cooperation. For the first time since its 
independence, Croatia took real steps towards EU accession: on October 29, 2001, EU-
Croatia Contractual Relations were established with the signing of the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement. In the same year Croatia also signed the Joint Declaration on 
Political Dialogue, and on February 21, 2003, the country applied for EU membership 
(Bartlett, 2003). On March 17, 2005, Croatia received EU approval for its Accession 
Negotiating Framework, and in March of the same year, the country began accession 
talks with the EU. 
The revival of a more liberal and democratic political ideology produced 
economic growth as well: the negative economic trends of the 1990s reversed slightly in 
2000 when fourteen government-owned small and medium sized firms were privatized. 
In 2000, GDP increased by 3.8%, and then in 2001 it continued to grow to 4% (US 
Department of State, 2006). The positive trends continued in 2002 when the economy 
  34 
 
expanded by 5.2%. This growth resulted from a credit boom led by newly privatized and 
foreign capitalized banks, from different capital investments, a strengthening in tourism, 
and from profits in small and medium sized private enterprises (Puljiz, 2003). Croatia 
definitely made progress, even if its subsequent economic and political successes varied 
from year to year.  
 But of all the issues that the new Prime Minister Ivica Racan had to deal with in 
the post-Tudjman era, two had prompted the most raucous criticism: one was the 
increased cooperation with the International Court Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), and the other was participation in regional Balkan associations (Lindstrom, 
2000).  Racan seemed unable to defeat the far right’s rhetoric (remains from Tudjman’s 
nationalist days) on certain aspects of reform. For instance, the issue over general Ante 
Gotovina’s arrest remained an obstacle well into the 2000s. 
 
THE CASE OF ANTE GOTOVINA 
Croatia’s opening negotiations got off to a bumpy start after the government 
refused to cooperate with the ICTY. In February of 2005, following a meeting with 
several Croatian government leaders, the French and German ministers responsible for 
European affairs applauded the progress made by Croatia towards EU integration, but 
maintained that the accession negotiations, provisionally scheduled to commence on 
March 17, remained dependent on the capture and extradition of Ante Gotovina, the 
former lieutenant general of the Croatian Army who served in the war (Bartlett, 2003). In 
2001 Gotovina was indicted by the ICTY for sanctioning war crimes under his command 
during Operation ‘Storm’ in 1995. 
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But then in early December of 2005, Gotovina was captured in the Canary Islands 
after the ICTY investigators received information on his whereabouts from the Croatian 
authorities. Many people were relieved after Gotovina’s capture since his freedom was 
perceived as the main obstacle to Croatia’s EU membership and integration. 
Subsequently, the ICTY prosecutor Carla Del Ponte praised the cooperation of the 
Croatian authorities with the ICTY and indicated that a significant number of outstanding 
cases would be transferred to the jurisdiction of courts in Croatia (UNC, 2006).  
And by this point the Croatian authorities amended other important political 
policies, such as recognizing the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
facilitating the return of Serb refugees to Croatia. Furthermore, the new and reformed 
HDZ turned pro-market and pro-EU. This new outlook was of outmost importance since 
it created consensus among Croatia’s political parties: the main objective became 
political and economic reform in order to join NATO and the EU.  
 
THE FULFILLMENT OF ECONOMIC AND MACROECONOMIC CRITERIA 
With regards to the economic criteria, the Commission concluded that Croatia is a 
functioning market economy. In other words, the country is now able to cope with 
competitive pressures and market forces within the EU. But in order to get to this point, 
the new administration had to introduce several economic and social reforms that would 
reduce the budgetary deficits and the external debt. For instance, certain retrenchment 
measures were implemented in order to better control healthcare spending. Moreover, 
initial steps were taken to restructure the unprofitable railway system, and several other 
unprofitable industries (such as the shipbuilding industry), in order to reduce the costs 
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occurring from these sectors. Also, a proposed change to the pension indexation system, 
which also served to limit expenditure, was implemented (European Commission, 2006). 
Moreover, different stabilizing macroeconomic policies helped lower inflation, 
stabilize the exchange rate, and even accelerate and increase monetary growth. Private 
investment strongly emerged and unemployment somewhat declined. Business 
registration procedures were simplified in order to encourage further privatization and 
small-scale entrepreneurships. Further progress was made to enhance competition in the 
telecommunication sector. All in all, these changes and reforms point to the idea that 
Croatia’s economy is well integrated with the economy of the EU (European 
Commission, 2006). Therefore, for the most part the post-Tudjman administration 
worked hard to improve Croatia’s standing with the EU, by reforming its economic and 
political policies and ideologies.  
 In the last seven years, the Croatian government, first led by the Social-Democrat 
Ivica Racan and then by the leader of the reformed HDZ, Ivo Sanader, has made 
membership in the EU its main strategic foreign policy objective. Now more than ever, 
Croatia and its political elites are asserting that their country belongs in Europe. And 
membership in the EU is seen as the ultimate recognition that Croatia no longer 
represents an exception, but is a normal and legitimate European nation, “equal in status 
and in character to others” (Jovic, 2006). But despite its noteworthy accomplishments, 
Croatia will have to fulfill additional political, economic and administrative reforms in 
order to join the EU by the end of the decade. 
 
ADDITIONAL NECESSARY REFORMS IN CROATIA 
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And now, twelve years after the war and nine years after Croatia’s attainment of 
full sovereignty over its territory, the country is finally a functioning and stable 
democracy. And as such, it will soon be ready to join the European Union. At the end of 
2006, the EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn said that Croatia will most likely 
join the European Union before 2010, providing, of course, that the Croatian Prime 
Minister Ivo Sanader, his team, and the Croatian people succeed in implementing all of 
the necessary judicial and public administration reforms.  
Rehn maintained that “fighting corruption and implementing judicial and public 
administration reforms should top Croatia’s agenda, as they affect not only the EU’s 
political criteria for membership, but are necessary prerequisites for a secure legal 
environment in the market economy” (The Associated Press, 2006). In other words, 
Croatia must pay further attention to its ailing judiciary, its burdensome administration 
and rampant corruption.  
Furthermore, it is critically important to continue cooperating with the ICTY, and 
to engage in regional cooperation, including the need to solve outstanding bilateral issues 
with Croatia’s neighbors. Although progress is evident overall, further sustained efforts 
are required in a number of areas. 
First, the existing legal administrative system is cumbersome and needs 
simplification. The wide discretionary scope in legislation leads to inefficiency and legal 
uncertainty, and it further facilitates corruption. As a result, a new civil service law was 
initiated in January 2006 (O’Brennan, 2006). However, civil service continues to suffer 
from undue political influence, high staff turnover and a lack of qualified personnel.  
Second, the implementation of a judicial reform strategy has begun. The vast 
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number of accumulated cases has been reduced, but it still remains a problem. Reform is 
at an early stage and the judicial system continues to suffer from severe shortcomings. 
More needs to be done to reduce the length of court proceedings, to improve case 
management, and to ensure fair and proper enforcements of law. To ensure neutrality and 
fairness in the court of law, the training of judicial officials needs to improve (European 
Commission, 2006).  
Third, a new anti-corruption program was adopted in March of 2006. The Office 
for the Prevention of Corruption and Organized Crime (USKOK) has improved. 
Measures have recently been taken in some previously uninvestigated corruption cases. 
However, corruption remains a serious problem. Many allegations of corruption remain 
uninvestigated and corrupt practices often go unpunished. USKOK and other bodies 
involved in this program need further strengthening and coordination. Full 
implementation of the program and strong political will to step up efforts are needed 
(European Commission, 2006). However, the fight against corruption is clearly not just 
about efficiently implementing European policies. Croatia needs to deal with corruption 
because of its own national interests, and the interests of its own citizens. An inefficient 
and corrupt justice system, for instance, kills entrepreneurship and slows down 
investment. It fosters unpredictability and compromises property rights. Thus, reforming 
the judiciary system and fighting corruption is of paramount importance for the future 
economic development of Croatia. 
Fourth, in the area of human rights and the protection of minorities progress 
continues to be made but at a very slow pace. With regards to minorities, there has been a 
significant increase in funding and greater attention devoted to the action plan The 
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Decade of Roma Inclusion. Politicians have demonstrated significant commitment 
towards the integration of minorities by establishing protection and equality laws 
(European Commission, 2006). However, more efforts are needed to combat intolerance 
and to encourage reconciliation. Implementation of the Constitutional Law on National 
Minorities continues to be slow, particularly when it comes to employment, and 
especially when the Roma are involved.  
Finally, in the area of regional cooperation there has been little progress made 
towards finding definitive solutions to various pending bilateral issues with Croatia and 
its neighbors, particularly when determining territorial delineations. Further efforts are 
needed for cooperation and good neighborly relations (European Commission, 2006).  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
After the disintegration of Yugoslavia in1991, Croatia and Slovenia ventured 
down very different paths. On the one hand, Slovenia experienced a relatively smooth 
economic, diplomatic, and political transition after its declaration of independence. 
Living standards remained fairly stable, and 90 percent of the country’s trade was 
reoriented westward. And its ex-communist political leaders still remain popular today: 
their ‘middle of the road’ attitudes and their effective transitional techniques granted 
them ubiquitous support (Rothchild & Wingfield, 2000). In other words, Slovenia’s pre-
war legacy of lawful governments, the absence of violent conflict with Serbia after the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia, and the fact that the country’s political and economic 
reforms began before there was a prospect of membership in the EU, best explain 
Slovenia’s successful path towards democratization, liberalization, and finally, the EU.   
Croatia, on the other hand, had to deal with political elites who exploited the 
language of nationalism primarily as a means to stay in power. And while some Croats 
respected Tudjman as the man who brought their country independence, others 
denounced him as a fascist tyrant. Tudjman’s nationalist rhetoric led to a lot of 
bloodshed, ethnic cleansing and it expanded the war to Bosnia and Herzegovina (Gagnon, 
2004). In other words, Tudjman’s nationalist, isolationist, and authoritarian rule, his role 
in the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the proliferation of fear and the 
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mistreatment of the media, and finally, the lack of cooperation of the 2000 government 
with the International Court Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, best explain Croatia’s 
dismal political and economic performance of the 1990s and early 2000s, especially in 
contrast to Slovenia and to some other CEE countries.  
For Croatia the ‘official’ journey towards Europe began only in 2000 when the 
more liberal and EU-friendly Social-Democrats came to power. And after keeping its 
membership on ice for years, Croatia was finally granted official candidate status by the 
EU in October 2005, when the newly reformed HDZ demonstrated improved compliance 
with the ICTY. Furthermore, Croatia made major adjustments to her economic policies, 
which resulted in the creation of institutions needed for a functioning market economy.  
According to Peer Vinther, the Head of the Delegation of the European 
Commission, Croatia has already “gained significant international credit, is widely 
accepted as a reliable partner and is already a model for its neighbors. The new 
government has accepted the crucial role that Croatia may be willing to play – and, 
indeed, already is playing –for the stabilization of the whole region: the Croatian example 
shows that geography is a fact but not a destiny” (Koschmieder, 2001, pg.149). In other 
words, the country has made extensive progress in transforming its economy, and in 
strengthening its political institutions. And while it is clear that the country’s post-
communist path differed significantly from that of the other Central and Eastern 
European states, for the past seven years Croatia has worked hard in order ‘to catch up’ 
and finally join the EU by 2010.  
Croatia has reformed greatly since its nationalist and isolationist days of the 
1990s. Today, Croatian and Slovenian trajectories appear to be merging as a result of the 
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political and economic reforms that the more liberal, democratic and pro-western parties 
have put into practice. And now that Croatia has become a more homogenous state, there 
is no longer the need to support extremist and xenophobic leaders such as Tudjman.   
Nevertheless, the country continues to face numerous challenges, given the 
significant ‘euroskepticism’ among the Croatian people, the enlargement fatigue in some 
of the fifteen older member states, and given its minor conflicts with certain existing 
member states (such as Italy and Slovenia) (Fisher, 2005). Also, the country will have to 
further reform some major policies involving corruption and organized crime, public 
administration, and the judiciary, in order to complete all the accession requirements. But 
despite the challenging road still ahead, Croatia seems willing and prepared to make all 
the amends necessary to join the EU.  
While speaking to the Croatian business elite on October 17th, 2005, Vladimir 
Drobnjak, the Croatian chief negotiator with the EU, said that “the point of negotiating 
with the European Union can be described as the complete and full transformation of 
Croatian society. EU accession means an increased standard of living, a stronger 
economy, and more opportunities for investment and new jobs being created day by day. 
By becoming a member of the Union, Croatia will enter the system of collective peace 
and security, and will become a valuable actor in the process of decision-making” (Jovic, 
2006). In other words, the country is willing to make tremendous sacrifices in order to 
achieve peace, economic stability, and the international recognition that Croatia always 
was and still is a legitimate European nation.  
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